with reference to civil and political rights, not to economic rights such as medical care. The fallacy of confusing practice and principle pervades a recent volume presenting a political economy critique of human rights in Africa. "[Flor countries that have known no peace, stability, or progress since their contact with the forces of Western imperialism, civil and political rights have no meaning."6 Apparently, something that one lacks is not meaningful; one is not capable of speculating on what the quality of one's life would be if one had that which one lacked. But social movements for political change arise precisely because people do envisage a life in which more of their rights are protected. International human rights are a standard to which it would not be necessary to devote so much effort if they were already firmly protected everywhere. Those who advocate human rights as a universal principle do so precisely because rights are not universally respected. To claim that that which is not present is irrelevant assumes that those who are denied rights do not have the intellectual capacity to articulate their suffering and to grasp the fundamental principles of justice that human rights imply. Such a claim reinforces the stereotype of the "native" as a non-thinking, primitive being whose pain is part of the one-ness of his existence.7
The second absolutist argument refers not to practice but to principle. Universal human rights are untenable because in principle, human rights are not a universal cultural ideal. This argument usually applies to the content of particular rights such as equality for women. "[T]he belief that women are entitled to equal status as citizens . . . is not universally accepted in African, Islamic or Western societies."8 But cultural absolutists simultaneously argue that human rights are a universal ideal. The concept of rights is universal, but the content (what, substantively, are or ought to be rights) varies among different societies. All cultures, absolutists claim, have some ideals of human rights, although these ideals may seem strange to Western eyes since they do not include norms such as equality that are basic to the United Nations' human rights framework. Thus, for example, the Hindu caste system is proposed as a system of human rights. "The fact that certain groups [in India], the lower castes, for example, the untouchables, are denied human rights in no way proves that the society lacks a concept of human rights."9 This approach argues that all systems of social justice are systems of human rights. It is more important to give all systems of justice the ideologically pure label of human rights than to differentiate among such systems and discover which ones allocate substantive and equal rights and dignity to all individuals purely on the basis of their humanity, and which allocate only privileges and duties contingent on unequal social status. The third absolutist argument is that universalism is untenable because (it is argued implicitly) indigenous cultures supersede human rights as a social good. This law carries more moral weight for absolutists than the law of universal human rights, although it is itself a principle that cannot be located in all cultural systems. If one were to look for it, one would probably find rather that most cultures believe that their own moral principles ought to be universal.
[Tmhe individual cannot but be convinced that his own way of life is the most Renteln believes that one can discover human rights, or their "homeomorphic equivalent"'4 in all societies. As an example of how to identify her universal homeomorphic equivalents, she uses the international legal prohibition of genocide. She reviews anthropological studies of retribution, feuds, and vendettas which, she argues, show that there are cultural rules of vengeance in most societies that limit the number of deaths permitted. This, Renteln contends, is evidence of a universal standard against genocide that is culturally entrenched, not dependent on a Western ethical norm.
One can certainly accept Renteln's view that international human rights standards have a better chance of being put into practice if they also reflect cultural ideals. This is a position that the Muslim legal scholar Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im also espouses, in his search for Qur'anic justifications for equal rights for women, better treatment for religious minorities, and the end of the notion of jihad (holy war) as a basis for relations between Muslim Culturalist arguments are usually made with respect to the former colonized nations of the world or to indigenous peoples in settler states. But to be consistent, culturalist arguments should also apply to large-scale, Western societies. All large-scale political units have internal cultures, although they may not be identified as such because internal conflicts and expressions of non-integrative particularist interests will be more obvious than in the small-scale, homogeneous communities that anthropologists have traditionally studied. If indigenous and third world cultures are to be allowed the complete play of their values, beliefs, norms, and customs regardless of whether or not they conform to international human rights standards, then the cultures of other societies should have the same privileges. Any society should be permitted to retain its culture regardless of human rights considerations. If absolutists reject this position then they are arguing that some cultures (in practice, indigenous third world ones) are more "absolute" than others; that some are absolutely worth preserving, whereas others can be changed or destroyed. They thus reverse the cultural imperialism that they contend characterizes the universal human rights documents, giving greater weight to non-Western than to Western ethical beliefs.
If culture is a preemptive social good, with a higher moral standing than human rights, and if the only universal rule is that one ought to act in accordance with the principles of one's own group, then no cultural absolutist should find shocking the following argument about the nature of Canadian society. 
Canada is a white Protestant society of British origin (except Quebec
)
IV. COMMUNITARIAN VERSUS INDIVIDUALIST PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIETY
The cultural absolutist critics of universal human rights look for a world that no longer exists, if it ever did: a world of community, of integrative membership of the individual in the group, and of a wholeness and unity with nature. Absolutists' defense of indigenous cultures against universalized human rights is to a large extent a consequence of their concern that human rights will encourage the emergence of an individualized, atomistic, and competitive social world. Absolutists idealize the third world community, which exemplifies for Western culture the primitive arcadia we have lost, even as the third world displays some of the worst human rights abuses of early modernization.
In the absolutist perspective, the preservation of the corporate entity of the community will do more to preserve human rights than introduction of the principle that the individual may make claims against society and the state. This corporate community, a product of over two hundred years of romantic reaction to the individualizing and liberating tendencies of modern capitalist society, is completely unproblematic. In its romantic rendering, internal inequities, power relationships, and brutalities disappear in a foggy haze of mythological collectivity. The "traditional" way of life beckons to our anxious citified psyches, reminding us all of the pristine collective origins from which we spring.
Individuals living in primitive, pre-capitalist communitarian societies are not permitted to change or to think about what they would like from life. Certainly, they are not permitted to deny our dream of Utopia by adopting Western artifacts or ideas. The Tasaday of the Philippines, for example, were accused by anthropologists of being fake primitives when they started to wear blue jeans and eat cheese crackers.37 In a similar vein, the contemporary primitives of third world societies are not permitted to be attracted to, to adopt or advocate, individualist ideals of personal autonomy or human rights. Those individuals from the third world who do express such ideas are quickly dismissed as "Westernized;" that is, as unauthentic, offending our view of the psychological role they play for us. "[Ilt is critical to realize that the Western-based notions of human rights, to the extent that they are articulated by third world political elites, reflect these elites' 'Westernization.' "38 While we value intellectual independence in our own tradition we refuse it to intellectuals in others; they are supposed to be conservative exemplars, not radical challengers, of their own traditional values.
The anti-individualist trend of the traditionalist nostalgia for community In the communitarian perspective, socially-prescribed roles, freely fulfilled, are assumed to result in rootedness in society. Such rootedness cannot exist for the presumably alienated Western individual, who experiences the confusion of having to make autonomous choices about how to live his or her life. Individualist society exhibits a free-for-all tolerance of disruptive, anomic deviance which carries with it a disregard for the actual consequences of deviant acts. The individualist adrift in a sea of normlessness, casting about for new rules to regulate his life, is confused and alienated from society, while his communitarian counterpart is firmly rooted in his social group.
For communitarians, social stratification is a sensible allocation of roles. Although honor is based on rank, there is no shame attached to those who are slotted into lesser positions as long as they fulfil their prescribed tasks with diligence. Caste distinctions are acceptable and all castes, including slaves, cooperate for the greater good of the whole community. Thus there is an underlying equality of respect. In individualist society, by contrast, those inherently deserving of respect, such as the aged or the priests and lawmakers, are frequently denied it. Ascribed caste distinctions give way to unpredictable class distinctions arising from unregulated competition for wealth and prestige; the "fittest" dominate by ignoring their obligations to others. The social whole breaks down into an anarchical system, in which neither respect nor economic security can be guaranteed even to those who dutifully fulfil their obligations to family, kin and society.
Thus individualism challenges the routine and valued orderliness of communitarian society. Upstarts abound, people abandon their social roles, honor disappears. Quiet communitarian life gives way to normative and social chaos.
In the communitarian view, the underlying glue that holds society together is its culture. The culture tends to be static and orderly; very little change is foreseen. One's primary identity comes from one's family or kin, then from larger social structures such as one's unchanging group, defined as ethnic, religious, or national. There is no social conflict within this group; rather, everyone accepts its rules and roles. Implicitly, the communitarian view denigrates social deviance and the stepping outside of social roles that, for example, women's liberation and the black civil rights movement have permitted in the Western world. Instead, it is assumed that contentedness comes from fitting into the group. It is also assumed that members of such closed corporate groups can and do live together in mutual tolerance when not rent by the selfish claims of individualistic deviants.
The individualist view of the antithesis between communitarian and individualist society is quite different. It stresses the repressive, discriminatory features of the ideologized communitarian society. In its view, prescribed family and kin ties are repressive or, indeed, demeaning and violent, as in the case of patriarchal violence against women and children. The social individual, therefore, ought to be free to choose other social networks that may be more important to her than family or kin. In individualist society no one is locked into traditional, prescribed social roles: sex roles can be ignored and deviance from traditional ways of life is permitted.
Individualists perceive the belongingness of closed social groups to encourage racial or ethnic exclusivism, while a more open society encourages real tolerance of others whatever their racial, ethnic or other ascriptive affiliations. In individualist society, a person must form an autonomous sense of herself, which may or may not result in a conscious decision to obey the social norms prescribed by tradition. Individual achievement is celebrated, while categorization of people on the basis of nonautonomous traits having nothing to do with personal achievement is viewed as degrading.
In the individualist world, respect must be earned; one is not entitled to it merely by virtue of one's rank. Shame is just as much a characteristic of communitarian society as honor; to be respected because one fills one's lowly position without complaint is in fact to suffer from permanent dishonor. 
V. CULTURAL ABSOLUTISM AND THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION
The absolutist critique trumpets the right to community over individual human rights, but only for people in other societies for whom critical and abstract thought is unauthentic. Thus in the culturally differentiated third world the individual loses her capacity to claim fulfillment of her human rights from the state or society; she renounces her human rights for the greater good of the collectivity. This renunciation is costless to her because her identity is merged with that of the group, so that human rights on an individual basis would seem not only irrelevant, but laughable. She is merged with her family and society in an organic oneness that fulfills both her creative and her social needs. And of course, since in this rendering she either does not live in a state or class society or is untouched by the state's or the ruling class' political and economic interests, she is entirely without need for the classic civil and political rights.
In the communitarian view of individualist rights-protective society, autonomy is seen as alienation. Pollis, for example, refers to the Western view of man as an "isolated, autonomous" creature.39 Autonomy, however, does not necessarily mean alienation from the community. Autonomy does mean that the individual makes decisions for herself and may well refuse socially prescribed roles in favor of other roles that seem preferable. The autonomous individual in Western society is frequently one who is connected to the community through freely chosen associations and friendships, as well as through continued family ties. Autonomously formed groups, subcultures, and neighborhoods abound in Western culture. The autonomous individual is not necessarily an alienated individual; she can rather be the Community is destroyed in modern societies where the individualist pursuit of wealth is the primary social value, and where the poor are systematically disregarded. The unbridled individualism typical of some sectors of the North American population is an indication that human rights are not being protected. Modern societies can be communities when the entire range of human rights-economic, social, and cultural as well as civil and political-is respected. In wealthy societies, such respect is certainly possible in practice, though it may be anathemic in principle to some sectors of such wealthy societies. Unbridled materialistic individualism is a strong argument for taking seriously the economic human rights upon which (in their rhetoric) socialist and third world countries have insisted in international debate. But it is not an argument for reducing autonomy, reimposing communitarian controls that limit individual choices, or eliminating the principle that individuals may make claims for their human rights on society and the state. murdered Jews because they regarded them as modern, cosmopolitan, rootless slime.43 They persecuted homosexuals because they denied their prescribed sex roles and their obligations to the German family, exhibiting, especially during the Weimar Republic, a free, autonomously chosen, and deviant lifestyle. 44 They debated whether to preserve the Gypsies as ethnographic museum specimens of the noble savage or to kill them as unauthentic half-breeds, finally choosing the latter course."4 In the Nazi mind, Jews and homosexuals epitomized selfish commercialism and individualism: Gypsies symbolized the worst impurities of contact between modernity and the primitive. There appears to be a collective amnesia in the international human rights literature, an unstated agreement to no longer speak of fascism. We have forgotten that fascist ideology was rooted in a romantic notion of an abandoned communitarian past. We now prefer to dwell only on the "good"-peaceful, loving, accepting, mutually tolerant--aspects of community that are relevant to the current critiques of liberalism. Fascism, we seem to believe, can't happen again; no contemporary society would turn its community inward to the extent that the Nazis did.
Yet Liberalism in North America is overly individualistic. Some aspects of community have disappeared and some types of community, especially a community of whites and blacks, never existed. But these problems cannot be rectified by recourse to the myth of a golden arcadian past. Romanticizing non-Western societies as embodiments of the values that we have lost, or never had, does not solve our problems; it merely obscures theirs. 48 Reliance on myths of communal living avoids discussion of serious ethical questions of how to ensure justice in the contemporary world. That much of the world was recently subjected to Western imperialism does not mean that it is now exempt from international ethical debate. Those who work for change within their own societies, and those who suffer both modern state-generated brutality and traditional rights abuses, are done a disservice by some Westerners' willingness to dismiss such suffering as culturally authentic, thus impervious to criticism from other cultural (philosophical, political) traditions.
Serious critical analysis of the human rights abuses that exist in nonWestern parts of the world does not necessarily imply imperialist policy recommendations. To criticize another society or political system because human rights abuses are intrinsic to its practices is not to advocate that one's own society should therefore take it over and rearrange matters. Contemporary human rights advocates are not the equivalent of nineteenth-century Christian missionaries; that their principles are sometimes coopted by selfserving political rhetoric does not mean that they are the de facto agents of their governments. Nor does ethical criticism of a society, whether one's own or others', imply that one regards all of its culture as unworthy. Many human rights-abusive practices that do exist are not intrinsic to the culture; rather they are consequences of economic or political interest.
Many critics of universal human rights from less-developed societies want to preserve their social values and are afraid that human rights will undermine them. But many aspects of culture, such as kinship patterns, art, or ritual, have nothing to do with human rights and can safely be preserved, even enhanced, when other rights-abusive practices are corrected. These include many aspects of public morality. The existence or abolition of polygynous marriage, for example, is not an international human rights issue, despite feminist objections to it in the West. Nor is the proper degree of respect one should show to one's elders, or the proper norms of generosity and hospitality. The apparent Western overemphasis on work at the expense of family is a cultural practice that third world societies can avoid without violating human rights. Many other such matters, such as whether criminal punishment should be by restitution or imprisonment, or whether homosexuals should have the right to ordination, can be resolved without violating international human rights norms.
Cultural absolutism forgives cruelty on the grounds that acting in accordance with the customs of one's own group is a universal moral principle. The actual values of various groups are brought to our attention when they seem to be universally "good," as in Renteln's highlighting of tendencies to limit retribution in small-scale societies, even though principled universality is rejected and only additive universality is accepted. But when the principles of such groups would seem to be "bad," when they condone denial of food to the weak or denial of respect to those ritually impure, they are ignored. Thus can non-Western societies be romanticized. In our longing for the good, we overlook evil, and claim we are doing so in the name of nonimperialist relativism. Culture is the absolute value, and individual suffering is lost in its embrace.
Cultural absolutists are the real ethnocentrists. They not only argue that no one's sense of justice can transcend the boundaries of her own culture, they also argue that one ought not to transcend them. When dealing with the underdeveloped world, abstract discussion of norms of human rights that do not reflect one's cultural embeddedness is a form of cultural betrayal.
Nevertheless, the West is expected to adhere to such abstract notions when in contact with the rest of the world. It is expected to compensate for its past colonial depredations, act in a non-racist manner both in its international
